We study large population stochastic dynamic games where the so-called Nash certainty equivalence based control laws are implemented by the individual players. We first show a martingale property for the limiting control problem of a single agent and then perform averaging across the population; this procedure leads to a constant value for the martingale which shows an invariance property of the population behavior induced by the Nash strategies.
Introduction
Noncooperative dynamic game theory has attracted a long lasting research interest for decades. In such games, the states of the players (also to be called agents) are governed by certain dynamics and each agent chooses its strategy in a process of interaction with other players. The most basic formulation takes the form of two-person zero-sum games where the dynamics are given by differential or difference equations, and the classical solution notion is saddle strategies [1] . By extending to a general N -person situation, one can assign each player with its own cost function and adopt Nash equilibrium strategies as a basic solution scheme.
In the setting of noncooperative dynamic games, when each agent has perfect state information for all agents involved, a well-known approach is to study feedback Nash strategies and employ dynamic programming to examine necessary conditions for the associated strategies and individual costs [2] . In continuous time stochastic models, this procedure derives a set of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. In general, the complexity of this approach is high, especially in the case of many players. Firstly, it is difficult to show existence and uniqueness of solutions to the coupled HJB equations, and secondly, the set of Nash equilibrium strategies, if existing, involves high implementational complexity since each player needs the state information of all other players.
On the other hand, in many social, economic and engineering scenarios [3−7] , it is typical to have a large number of agents performing decision-making, and a characteristic feature of these systems is that each agent faces the average influence of the overall population while receiving a negligible impact from any other specific agent. Motivated by these phenomena, in our earlier work we formulated a class of stochastic dynamic games with many players and weak coupling. For obtaining low complexity solutions, the so-called Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) methodology has been developed in a series of works [5,8−11] . The key idea of this methodology is to specify a certain consistency relationship between the individual strategies and the mass effect (i.e., the overall effect of the population on a given agent) within the population limit. By this approach, each decision-maker can ignore the fine details of the behavior of all individual players by only focusing on the overall impact of the population. This methodology avoids the generation of a large coupled HJB equation system with as many equations as the population size. In the end, this procedure leads to decentralized strategies for the individual players in the system of N players.
In this paper, we study the large population behavior by identifying an invariance property in terms of the instantaneous cost, the value function and the empirical distribution function of the states of all agents. In our asymptotic analysis, we let N → ∞. This essentially amounts to considering a family of game problems with an increasing number of agents.
In the NCE methodology, each agent can be viewed as essentially solving a local optimal control problem. And on the other hand, in the stochastic optimal control literature, it is well known that under very mild conditions, the sum of the past cost calculated up to the current time along the optimal state-control and the future optimal cost is given as a martingale [12, 13] . Compared to the usual HJB equation characterization of the value function, this martingale representation reveals sample path properties for the optimally controlled process. Now, by extending the martingale results in optimal control to the population limit of the dynamic game and averaging across the population to eliminate randomness, one obtains a deterministic martingale and hence a constant value over time. This gives the so-called invariance property. Subsequently, by interpreting the measure process, appearing in the closed-loop McKean-Vlasov equation, as the limiting population state empirical distribution, we obtain an invariance property associated with the controlled population behavior when the NCE strategies are implemented by the agents.
The organization of the remaining part of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the large population dynamic game problem in the general nonlinear context. The NCE based decentralized control synthesis is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we characterize the martingale property in the population limit and establish the invariance property. The special case of LQG systems is then analyzed in Section 5 for illustration. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Stochastic Dynamic Game Model
In a population of N agents, consider the dynamics for an individual agent dz i (t) = 1 N N j=1 f ai (z i (t), u i (t), z j (t))dt + σdw i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, t ≥ 0,
where {w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } denotes N independent standard scalar Wiener processes and a i ∈ R
